Acknowledgement: We thank participants in a corporate governance seminar at NYU for many useful suggestions.
ABSTRACT:
This paper attempts to bridge a gap between the voluminous merger literature in finance and an equally large literature on vertical integration in industrial organization.
We develop a classification to separate the various types of mergers, and focus on the determinants and wealth impact of vertical mergers over the period . Abnormal returns for vertical merger announcements are positive until 1996 and turn negative afterwards. Acquirers suffer most of the losses. We present and test several hypotheses based upon the most common I/O theories of vertical integration. We find support for the most fundamental insight in the I/O literature, namely, that vertical mergers generate most value when undertaken in imperfectly competitive markets and when firms have to invest in specialized assets making market exchanges difficult. There is little evidence that information based contracting problems or price uncertainty, as least as captured in this paper, generate a value maximizing rationale for vertical integration. However, such problems can motivate horizontal mergers.
A large body of literature, discussed in detail in the next section, shows that in the presence of imperfect competition, firms can generate value by vertical integration. Although the details of the outcome vary across these models based on assumptions and specifications, they collectively suggest that these gains may arise from the possibility of rationing inputs, shutting out competitors and from price discrimination. We find support for these theories in our data. Vertical deals in which both the target and the acquirer are large players in their industries are associated with positive total returns to the tune of 3.08% relative to other vertical deals. However, horizontal or conglomerate mergers between big players are not associated with similar positive returns. Moreover, these returns to dominant acquirers and targets are higher when the respective industries are more concentrated. We also find, as predicted in much of the I/O literature, that these vertical mergers are detrimental to competitors of the target and the acquirer. Market power based theories of vertical integration are divided as to the benefits or costs to consumers of such integration (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 , Salinger, 1988 , Hart and Tirole, 1990 , Riordan, 1998 to name a few). Our results address this question to some extent, although a complete answer must include consumer surplus and similar measures.
Another potential benefit of vertical integration may arise in the presence of asset specificity. Williamson (1983) was the first to classify asset specificity. Perry (1989) , among others, shows that when firms need to invest in assets that are specialized and market exchange is difficult, vertical integration may lead to efficient investment. In line with Caves and Bradburd (1988) we use R&D expenditure to capture asset specificity, and find that vertical deals when both the target and acquirer are R&D intensive, is associated with higher total returns. These gains are seen only in vertical deals and not in horizontal or conglomerate deals 3 . Grossman and Hart (1986) show that with incomplete contracts vertical integration may align investment incentives. The empirical I/O evidence on this matter, which is all industry specific, is mixed (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) . We use analyst coverage to proxy for information opacity and the difficulty of arm's length contracting. However, we find no evidence that vertical integration leads to higher returns in the presence of information problems. Lastly, we examine if in the presence of price uncertainty, vertical integration may be associated with efficient production decisions and therefore higher value. We use the volatility of producer price index in the acquirer and target industry to capture price uncertainty and find no effect on the value generated from vertical or any other type of merger. 3 There is a variety of other measures used for asset specificity in I/O studies (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) . However, the vast majority of these studies focused on one industry and thus measures could be more industry specific.
In summary, we find that unlike horizontal deals, vertical transactions are not always associated with positive wealth effects for shareholders. They appear to generate the greatest returns when dominant firms integrate and are able to shut out or discriminate against rival firms. There is weak evidence that vertical integration generates value when assets are specialized and no evidence that information problems or price uncertainty present opportunity for value maximizing vertical integration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical rationales for value maximizing vertical integration and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 develops our measures of vertical integration, Section 4 describes the data and discusses wealth effects of mergers, Section 5 examines the various rationales for vertical mergers and finally Section 6 concludes.
II. VALUE DETERMINANTS OF VERTICAL MERGERS AND HYPOTHESIS
In this section, we briefly review the literature that documents theoretically and empirically the value of vertical integration. 4 The vast majority of the empirical I/O literature covers one industry, and sometimes includes industry specific proxies, such as paper capacity for the pulp and paper industry (see Ohanian, 1994) or number of rooms (See Kehoe, 1996) . Therefore we focus the discussion on some general properties which may make vertical integration advantageous and suggest proxies which cut across industries 5 .
Several papers, starting with Stigler (1951) point out that in the presence of non-competitive markets vertical integration may be beneficial. Many studies examine the role of vertical integration when there is a dominant firm in the industry (See Riordan (1998) , Williamson (1971) and Salinger (1988) ). Riordan (1998) , for example, shows that if there is a dominant firm in an industry with a cost advantage relative to a competitive fringe, then it will tend to vertically merge backwards. This increases the dominant firm's capacity at the expense of the fringe. Both output and input prices increase in the degree of vertical integration. Although a vertical merger may lead to a decrease in profits for some of the firms in the fringe, profits increase for the dominant firm.
Other papers, such as Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) ) and Tirole et al. (1990) , show that vertical integration may be value maximizing if it raises the cost to rivals. In an oligopolistic setting, a firm 4 It is virtually impossible to consider every contribution-a recent survey of the empirical work alone (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) has a reference list of over 150 papers. 5 Similarly, in a wide ranging study which covers vertical integration in 93 countries, Acemoglu et al. (2007) focus on the few variables which are general and vary from country to country. may buy its suppliers and thus shut out rival buyers altogether or increase their costs. In a similar vein, Hart and Tirole (1990) note the importance of "market foreclosure" in making vertical mergers relevant and a value maximizing proposition (see also Chen and Rirordan (2003) and Klein and Murphy (1997) ).
The details of the outcome vary across models and depend on assumptions related to demand functions (Dixit (1983) ) or the specification of downstream competition and existing externalities (see deFontenay and Gans (2005) ). However, collectively these models suggest that non-competitive markets with the possibility of rationing, shutting out competitors and price discrimination generate a rationale for vertical integration. (See also McNicol (1975 ), or Perry (1980 , and a survey by Perry (1989) ). Our analysis can determine whether or not vertical mergers generate greater value for shareholders in non-competitive, as collectively suggested by the models briefly surveyed so far. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
H1: Vertical mergers between firms with large market shares should be associated with higher returns. These returns should be higher in concentrated industries.
The presence of transaction costs may affect the optimality of vertical integration as pointed out by Williamson (1975) , Klein et al. (1978) , Williamson and Riordan (1985) , and Perry (1989) . In particular, when firms need to invest in assets that are specialized, and when market exchange of these assets is costly, vertical integration may align the incentives of parties and lead to efficient investment (see also Joskow, 1993) ; This insight is nicely stated in Caves and Bradburd (1988, p.268 ) "The chief empirical predictors of vertical integration coming from the transaction cost model are small numbers of transactors on both sides of the market ex-ante and the prevalence of transaction specific assets and switching costs that create ex post lock in problems with arm-length transactions". In other words, we would expect mergers, which create "internal markets" to work better for companies with high asset specificity. Asset specificity in that sense can be related to dedicated assets, geographical distance or human capital or it can be more general. Most of the numerous empirical I/O studies (most of them industry specific) find that asset specificity increases vertical integration. Spiller (1985) considers vertical mergers and uses as an independent variable the distance between plants, which proxies for specificity of assets. He finds that distance negatively affects stock returns in mergers. Naturally the analysis is much different than ours. Levy (1985) finds no relation between distance and returns but finds that research and development intensity, another measure of asset specificity, effect returns. 6 Masten et al. (1989) show that measures of human capital and asset specificity increase the proportion of parts in the auto industry produced by the manufacturer, which their measure of integration. Lieberman (1991) , studies plant level and firm level integration in the Chemical industry and also concludes that the probability of vertical integration increases with asset specificity and input variability. Caves and Bradburd (1988) show that R&D significantly affects the probability of mergers. Masten et al. (1989) Anderson and Scmittlein (1984) are among the other studies which use R&D as a proxy for asset specificity. 7 We follow this body of work and use R&D intensity to capture asset specificity and study its role in generating value through vertical integration.
H2: Vertical mergers should be associated with higher returns when the target and/or the acquirer are R&D intensive.
Some of the studies of vertical integration focus on incomplete contracts and the incentives they create. If contracts are hard to specify, enforce, and monitor from the outside, and it is cheaper to monitor and contract within the firm, then vertical integration can increase efficiency. Grossman and Hart (1986) suggest that investment incentives may differ as a result of the allocation of control rights ex-post, and thus, depending on relatedness, vertical integration may provide the correct investment incentives. A similar framework underlies Tirole (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) . Klein. Hughes and Kao (2001) model more directly the advantage gained by information sharing between upstream and downstream firms in non-competitive markets. If vertical integration is an efficient tool in a world of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, then vertical mergers should be associated with higher returns when contracting is harder. We use the degree of information opacity of the target and acquiring firm to capture instances where arm length contracting is less effective and formulate our next hypothesis.
H3: Vertical mergers should be associated with higher returns when there is less information about the target and the acquirer.
Another rationale for vertical integration, which has been used often in the popular press, is the presence of supply price uncertainty. For example, one of the benefits cited for the vertical merger Quite a few papers (see the survey by Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) use geographical measures to proxy for monitoring cost in empirical studies. Kedia, Uysal and Panchapagesan (2006) examine distance between acquirer and target and find that though nearby deals have higher returns relative to distant deals, this relation is the same for all types of mergers. We therefore do not look at distance in our paper.
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Weiss (1992) using an interesting research design, considers the correlation between abnormal returns of vertically merging firms in order to account for firms specific capital. However, he has only 18 daily cases and 11 monthly cases over 25 years.
between Disney and ABC was that it allowed ABC to have greater control over the content, i.e., supply for TV programming. Though supply uncertainty affects everybody, its presence may give a rationale for vertical integration if such integration allows for efficient organization of production or cheaper gathering of information (see Carlton (1979) , Arrow (1975) and more recently Baker Gibbons and Murphy (2002) ). Therefore, we propose:
H4: Vertical mergers should be associated with higher returns when there is greater price uncertainty in the acquirer and the target industries.
We now proceed to discuss our empirical strategy and our findings.
III. MEASURING VERTICAL INTEGRATION.
The most important empirical barrier to the analysis of vertical merger is identification of mergers as horizontal vertical or conglomerate. We follow Fan and Goyal (2006) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) and use the industry commodity flow information in the Use Table of to capture the degree of vertical integration between industries i and j. We use the average of the coefficients for vertical relation as very often industries sell in both directions, and ignoring one direction might bias our analysis. As the Use tables give flows between IO industries, we convert the acquirer and target CRSP SIC code to the IO industry and assign it the corresponding vertical integration coefficient.
We classify the mergers as vertically related if the corresponding vertical coefficient is larger than a certain cutoff. For robustness, we consider 3 alternative cutoffs: 1, 5 and 10 percent.
A merger transaction is classified as horizontal if both the acquirer and the target are in the same industry as captured by four-digit CRSP SIC code. If the four-digit SIC industry has a high vertical relation coefficient with itself, i.e., the industry uses a high fraction of its own output then a horizontal merger will also be classified as vertically related. We refer to such transactions as mixed horizontal vertical mergers. Pure horizontal mergers, on the other hand, are mergers classified as horizontal mergers that are not vertically related. Similarly, pure vertical mergers are those that are classified as vertically related but are not horizontal. Lastly, if a transaction is neither horizontal nor vertical it is classified as a conglomerate merger.
As mentioned above we use three cutoffs, i.e., 1%, 5% and 10% to classify a merger as vertically related 8 .We also use three different definitions of industry, four digit CRSP SIC codes, two digit SIC codes as well as Fama French Industry classifications. This analysis leads to nine different classifications of mergers into the different types i.e., vertical, horizontal, mixed and conglomerate.
We will use these different classifications to test for the strength and robustness of our results.
IV. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND WEALTH EFFECTS
Our data on acquisitions is from the Securities Data Company's U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We select mergers and acquisitions announcements in which both the target and acquirer are U.S. publicly listed firms; with announcement dates between 1979 and 2002. We consider only completed deals and exclude LBOs, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender and exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and asset sales. We further require that acquirer and target's price data exist in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and that we are able to calculate the vertically related coefficient. Our final sample consists of 1692 transactions. Table I shows We report most of our main results using four digit SIC classification, which is more precise and using a 1% cutoff. We also report the impact on these results as we move to stricter cutoffs and to Fama French industry classification. Another feature of table 1, consistent with most other work on mergers, is that it shows significant clusters over time in merger activities including merger waves in the late 80's and the late 90's 9 . Also, it seems that vertical mergers were more prevalent in the late 80's and late 90's; however, it is difficult to point to a real time trend.
We consider acquirer and target wealth effects using standard event study methodology. We estimate cumulative abnormal returns over the (−1, +1) day window using CRSP value-weighted index returns with the parameters estimated over the 255 days estimation period that ends 46 days before the initial merger announcement 10 . The total or aggregate return is the weighted return of the acquirer and target, where weights are relative market capitalization ten days prior to the announcement.
We find that pure vertical mergers are associated with positive total returns of 1.1% (See Table 2 ).
However, the average total return to vertical deals is significantly lower than the 4.7% earned by pure horizontal mergers and is also lower than the 1.9% earned by conglomerate mergers. The better performance of horizontal mergers is consistent with Fee and Thomas (2004) , who cover a similar period, even though their definition of horizontal mergers is somewhat different than ours 11 . The relative underperformance of vertical mergers with respect to conglomerate mergers, however, is in contrast to Fan and Goyal (2006) who report significantly higher returns for vertical deals. When we use Fama French Industries and a 5% cutoff for classifying vertical mergers, we find that although average return to vertical mergers is still lower than returns for conglomerate mergers, this difference is not significant (See Panel B). With other different classifications we continue to find that vertical merger returns are lower than the returns of conglomerate mergers, although this difference is not always statistically significant. To summarize, as far as we can tell, vertical mergers are (at least weakly) worse than horizontal and conglomerate mergers. Mixed mergers seem to be bad as well perhaps because they offer no clear rationale to investors.
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See Moeller et al. (2005) and Andrade et al. (2001) .
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We also estimated a (-5, +5) window. Results are similar; however, given the many different classifications we already present, we do not include these tables. They are available upon request.
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In order to understand the difference in our results from Fan and Goyal (2006) , we split our sample into transactions before 1996 (Fan and Goyal sample period) and deals announced after 1996.
We find significant differences between the two sample periods. First, there appears to be a decline in returns for all types of mergers after 1996. This is explored at length in Moeller et al. (2005) .
However, there is significantly greater decline in the performance of vertical mergers. The average return to vertical deals was about 2.8% before 1996 and -0.9% after that. In contrast, the return to conglomerate deals is not significantly different between the two time periods. This causes vertical deals to do better than conglomerate deals before 1996 and worse after 1996. One explanation for the lower returns to vertical deals after 1996 may be that they were not motivated by fundamental forces in the industry that favored vertical integration 12 . As discussed earlier, vertical deals were more frequent after 1996. Pure vertical deals are about 20% of all deals before 1996 and 25% after 1996 using four digit SIC and 1% cutoff. Thus, it may be that we are lower on the diminishing returns curve during the later time period.
When we decompose total returns into target returns and acquirer returns, we find that, in line with all prior literature starting from Bradley Desai and Kim (1988) Next we control for firm and deal characteristics. We control for mode of payment by including a dummy variable (Anystock) that takes the value one if stock is used for payment. As cash deals are associated with higher returns in most other work, we expect the coefficient of Anystock to be negative and significant. We control for acquirer size by including acquirer total assets in the year prior to the announcement of the deal. We include the ratio of target size to acquire size (TarSize_AcqSize) to control for relative size of the transaction. As small targets relative to the acquirer are likely to have lower wealth effects, we expect the coefficient of relative size to be positive. Naturally, we include a dummy for pure horizontal deals, pure vertical deals and mixed horizontal vertical deals. Conglomerate is the default. Table 3 , contains OLS regressions. The findings are qualitatively similar to the univariate results discussed above. Pure horizontal mergers feature significantly higher returns over the entire period, in particular before 1996 (column 3). This is consistent with the findings of Shahrur (2005) Moeller et al.(2005) show that wealth destruction for acquirers in mergers accelerated from 1998 through 2001, which is consistent with our findings.
interprets the positive outcome of horizontal mergers as the result of increases in efficiency. The coefficient of pure vertical mergers is not significant for the whole sample implying that pure vertical mergers are not different from conglomerate mergers. However, for the period after 1996, pure vertical mergers are associated with significantly lower total returns. These results are robust to different definitions of industry and different cutoffs for vertical integration 13 . In line with the evidence in Table 2 , we find that most of the returns accrue to the target and further that target returns are not significantly different across merger types. It is the difference in acquirer returns that drives the outcomes.
V. DETERMINANTS OF VERTICAL MERGERS AND RETURNS
In this section, we test several industrial organization theories that posit that vertical integration may be beneficial under particular cirumcstances. It may be the case that, although vertical mergers on aggregate at least weakly destroy value, certain types of vertical mergers make economic sense.
Market Share and Industry Concentration
As discussed in Section 2, several theories proposed by Williamson (1971) , Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990 ), and Tirole et. al (1990 ) Riordian (1998 , and others, suggest that vertical integration can generate value in non-competitive industries. These observations are summarized in hypothesis 1.
To study the impact of acquirer and target industry dominance we find target and acquirer market shares. Target market share is the sales of the target company divided by industry total sales in the year prior to the announcement of the merger. Industry is defined by four digit SIC classification and encompasses all firms with data in Compustat. Similarly, the acquirer market share is the share of the acquirer in total industry sales. To capture the case when acquirer and target are dominant players in their respective industries, we create a dummy (High Share) that takes the value one when both the acquirer and the target are in the top decile of all observations. The top deciles include targets with a market share larger than 10% and acquirers with market shares in excess of 40% in their respective industries. 13 We did not report the results of using Fama French industry classifications and different cutoffs for brevity. The results are qualitatively similar and are available from the authors upon request.
The results for this estimation are reported in Table 4 . We estimate the model separately for each type of merger, as the impact of market shares on total returns is likely to vary by type of merger. 14 Consistent with hypothesis 1, we find that when both the acquirer and the target are dominant players in their respective industries, vertical mergers are associated with higher total returns (column 2). The high market share is positive for all mergers, but it is only significant for vertical mergers.
This result that vertical mergers have higher returns when the target and acquirer are dominant firms in the industry is fairly robust. When we use Fama French industry classifications (and a similar cutoff of 1%) we continue to find that the High share dummy is positive and significant (see Panel B, Table 4 ). However, with a 5% cutoff for classifying vertical deals the high share dummy, though still positive, loses significance. As discussed earlier, with these stricter criteria, there are fewer deals that are classified as pure vertical and the small number of observations may account for the loss of significance.
We also examine the distribution of total returns to targets and acquirers. 15 Consistent with the previous discussion, the High share dummy is not significant in explaining target and acquirer returns except for vertical deals where it significantly increases target returns (See Table 5 ). This suggests that the targets have higher bargaining power in situations where there are gains to be divided up in vertical mergers.
If these gains to vertical merger are based on the I/O theories discussed they should be more noteworthy in concentrated industries. Dominant firms should have a greater ability to impose costs on rivals in concentrated industries than in competitive industries. To examine this idea, we also include target and acquirer Herfindahl indices, calculated at the four digit SIC level. An industry is defined as a concentrated industry if the Herfindahl index is the top quartile for all observations. In Table 6 , we include the Hefindahl dummy and an interactive dummy, which characterizes firms with large market shares operating in concentrated industries. Vertical integration between dominant acquirers and targets both operating in concentrated industries significantly increases total returns. CARs in these cases are 7.5% higher than in other vertical mergers controlling for firm and deal characteristics. No such returns can be observed for other types of mergers. As we can see in panel B, this result is robust to using F-F industries to characterize the companies in our sample.
14 Alternatively, we could have run one regression including interaction terms of these market share variables with merger types. We choose not to report results in this way as it is cumbersome due to inclusion of so many interaction terms. We estimated this model and find that the results are similar.
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Other factors, like the number of competing bids, are likely to be important in determining the share of the target in the overall returns. However, these variables are not likely to be correlated with the type of merger.
If the gain in vertical mergers, when the acquirer and target are large firms, is due to the increased ability to impose costs on rival firms from rationing or price discrimination, then other firms in the industry should experience negative returns on the announcement of the deal.
To test this implication, we calculate in table 7 abnormal returns for all firms in the acquirer's industry, except the acquirer, over the -1 to 1 day window surrounding the announcement of the transaction. We then calculate the market value weighted average returns for all other firms in the industry. Similarly, we calculate the average abnormal return to all other firms in the target firms industry. The average return to competing firms in both the acquirer and target industries is significantly negative when the acquirer and target have high market share in vertical deals. There is no significant relation between market share of acquirer and target and returns to rival firms for other types of mergers. This further supports theories that suggest that gains in vertical mergers arise from increased ability to impose costs on rivals. Most of the transactions that are classified as vertical deals between large acquirers and targets were announced before 1996, and may account for the better outcomes for vertical deals in the early part of our sample period.
In summary, our findings so far agree with the initial notion, going back to Williamson (1971) that vertical integration will only be viable in non-competitive environment, but it also supports other models that follow the transaction costs hypotheses. Our results also agree with results in the empirical I/O literature such as Lieberman (1991) which suggest that high concentrations increase the probability of integration. It is interesting to see that both the acquirer and the target concentration matter, confirming the idea that indeed, non-competitive industries are the source of gains in this type of mergers.
R&D Expenditures and Asset Specificity
In the presence of asset specificity, vertical integration may facilitate the alignment of incentives of the two parties and ensure efficient investment. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 suggests that vertical deals should be associated with higher total returns. As noted, we follow Caves and Bradburd (1988) and use R&D expenditures normalized by sales to capture asset specificity. If both the acquirer and the target engage in high levels of R&D, vertical integration may reduce the inefficiencies associated with market exchanges of these assets. Empirically, we classify targets and acquirers as high R&D if they are in the top deciles of R&D for the sample. This includes targets with 25% or more of sales in R&D and acquirers with 40% or more of sales in R&D.
Consistent with hypothesis 2, we find that when target and acquirer are both high R&D firms, vertical mergers are associated with higher total returns (see Table 8 ). Such deals are associated with 4%
higher returns relative to other vertical mergers. Further, there is no such gain to high R&D in other type of mergers. The coefficient of acquirer R&D is negative and significant for vertical deals.
When Fama French industry classifications are used, high R&D has significantly higher returns though target R&D is negative and significant (See Panel B). This suggests that as in the case of oligopolies, the action is in cases where both target and acquirer are at the high end of the asset specificity range. Since R&D is a somewhat crude measure of what we are trying to gauge, we see the impact when we focus on the more extreme cases. We also note that most of the vertical mergers that were classified as being between acquirers and targets with high R&D were announced after 1996, suggesting that the motivation of vertical deals may have shifted from exploiting competitive advantages to managing inefficiencies arising from asset specificity over the sample period. The lower return to high R&D transactions relative to high-market-share-transactions may explain at least partially the lower returns to vertical deals after 1996.
There is no evidence to suggest that these higher total returns in the presence of high R&D primarily accrue to either the target or the acquirer. As seen in Table 9 , both acquirer and targets obtain higher returns although they are not statistically significant. The result that vertical integration is associated with higher total returns when both targets and acquirers are high R&D holds when we use different industry classifications, namely, Fama French or two-digit SIC. The result is less significant when we use stricter classification criteria, such as a 5% cutoff to classify vertical mergers. As discussed above the number of deals classified as pure vertical drops with the stricter criteria and might account for the lack of significance 16 .
In summary, our findings thus offer only some support for the "transaction costs" approach.
Information Asymmetry
To test hypothesis 3 i.e., the relationship between merger returns and available information about the target and the acquirer, we gather data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) about the number of analysts that provide earning estimates for the target and the acquirer in the year prior to the merger announcement. The dummy Target Infodum takes a value of one if the target has no analyst coverage. Similarly, the dummy Acquirer Infodum takes the value of one if the acquirer has 16 These results are not reported in the paper for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
no analyst coverage. Finally, the dummy High Information Asymmetry takes the value one when both the acquirer and the target have no analyst coverage.
There is no evidence that information asymmetry as captured by analyst coverage has any impact on total returns in vertical deals as seen in Table 10 . However, horizontal deals seem to be associated with higher returns in the presence of high information asymmetry. We can suggest that when both the acquirer and the target have information problems with respect to the financial markets, but operate in the same industry, it is likely that they are able to evaluate each other's prospects properly.
It may not he possible for acquirers and targets that span different industries to resolve their information problems via integration. In unreported results we find that the higher total returns to horizontal mergers under high information asymmetry accrue mostly to acquirers.
Price Uncertainty
Finally, we examine the role of price uncertainty in making vertical integration valuable. We gather data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the producer price index for the target and acquirer industries. The Producer Price Index (PPI) program measures the average change over time in the selling prices received by domestic producers for their output. As a measure of price uncertainty, we compute the variance of the monthly PPI in the thirty-six months prior to the merger. In unreported regressions, we observe that merger returns are unrelated to price uncertainty. The coefficient of our uncertainty measures shifts between positive and negative for different classifications of vertical integration and is never significant. Price uncertainty is also never significant in explaining returns in other type of mergers. This does not support results of papers such as Lieberman (1991)(for the chemical industry). If indeed we could find a relationship, we could support models such as Carlton (1977) which suggest that producing inputs internally (vertically integrating) can help a firm when facing price uncertainty by allowing it to produce cheaply.
VI: Conclusions
This paper bridges a gap between the voluminous merger literature in finance and the voluminous literature on vertical integration in industrial organization.
Consistent with prior work, we find that horizontal mergers are associated with significantly higher returns and that these returns are time varying. Surprisingly, we find that vertical mergers are very different. During our entire sample period, vertical merger returns have not been significantly different from returns on conglomerate mergers. Similar to Fan and Goyal (2006) , we find that vertical mergers are associated with positive value before 1996 but our work shows that returns turn significantly negative later.
We find support for the most fundamental insight in the I/O literature, that is, that vertical integration of firms that wield market power in concentrated industries increases shareholder value.
We find less support for other suggested motives for vertical integration. In particular, we find that vertical mergers generate value when firms invest in specialized assets making market exchanges difficult. There is little evidence to support the view that information based contracting problems or price uncertainty, at least as captured in this paper, generate a value maximizing rationale for vertical integration. However, such problems can motivate horizontal mergers. The classification of deals is based on four-digit SIC from CRSP with a 1% cutoff for vertical classification. Pure Horizontal (vertical) dummy takes the value one if the transaction is only a horizontal (vertical) transaction. The horizontal vertical dummy takes the value one if the deal is both a vertical and a horizontal transaction. Tarsize_Acqsize is the ratio of target size to acquire size, Any stock is a dummy if stock is used for payment in the transaction, and Acq_Assets is the total assets of the acquirer in the year prior to the announcement. P-values are in parenthesis below.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Table 4 Total Returns and Target and Acquirer Market Shares
The dependent variable is total returns measured over the [-1,1] window. Panel A uses four digit SIC with a 1% cutoff for classification whereas Panel B uses Fama French Industries and also a 1% cutoff for classification. Separate results for are reported for subgroups 1) Pure Vertical: Transactions that are classified as only vertical, 2) Pure horizontal and mixed: transactions that are classified as horizontal or as mixed vertical horizontal, and 3) Conglomerate: Transactions that are neither vertical nor horizontal. Tarsize_Acqsize is the ratio of target size to acquire size. Any stock is a dummy that takes the value one if there is any stock payment for the transaction. Acq_Assets is the size of the acquirer. Target (acquirer) market share is the ratio of target (acquirer) sales to industry sales (same four digit SIC as the target (acquirer)). High share dummy takes the value one if both the target and the acquirer have high market shares. Target (acquirer) is defined as having high market share if it is in the top 10% percentile. The top percentile includes targets with greater then 10% of market share and acquirers with greater than 40% of market share. All years for which data is available are included. P values are given in parenthesis below. 
